Strikes by Lancet kamikaze drones, once one of Russia's most effective battlefield weapons, have fallen off sharply in recent months. This appears to be thanks to Ukraine's growing number of FPV interceptor drones which are changing the shape of the conflict.
The Lancet is a long-range killer, striking at distances of over 25 miles and with a shaped-charge warhead capable of knocking out tanks. It has been notably effective in damaging Ukrainian artillery, as the drone can pursue moving targets. But the number of strikes recorded by Russian OSINT site Lostarmour - which has a semi-official role providing data to Lancet makers ZALA - has been falling, from 180 in August to 81 in September, 100 in October and, with more than half the month gone, just 24 in November so far.
The interceptors are not bringing down many Lancets: instead they are taking out the reconnaissance and communication assets which enable them to find targets.
Undermining The Support
The Lancet operates in a hunter-killer team with ZALA reconnaissance drones. These with survey an area and identify and locate a target. Once this is confirmed, the Lancet is launched. The reconnaissance drone may also act as a flying radio relay, making the Lancet more resistant to jamming. It will observe the strike, and carry out post-strike damage assessment to determine whether to send a follow-up attack. In many cases the LostArmour videos include multiple strikes against the same target until it is destroyed.
The presence of these scouts ensures that every Lancet attack is documented. LostArmour does not have all of them, as the majority, something lie 70%, are misses, and few of these are posted on social media.
The Lancets themselves are difficult to intercept: they fly at low altitude straight to the target and are now in the air long. There are occasional videos of Lancets being brought down, but they are rare.
What are far more common are interceptions of the ZALA reconnaissance drones, which loiter over and area for a prolonged period at high altitude. They are often easily visible, but bringing them down is not so straightforward. It is possible to hit one with a Stinger or other shoulder-launched missile, but a Stinger costs around $480k; such missiles are therefore scarce and reserved for higher-value targets - aircraft, helicopters, Shahed drones - as there simply are not enough to tackle the thousands of Russian reconnaissance drones.
This changed in September as Ukraine started to field large number of quadcopters interceptors. Made by groups like Wild Hornets, these are adaptations of the FPVs used to attack ground targets, with new shrapnel warheads, superior batteries and other adaptations. The interceptors can reach up to 12,000 feet, leaving no safe space for Russian drones.
"Recently, we have noted a significant decrease in the enemy's use of Lancet kamikaze drones," noted drone fundraiser Serhii Sternenko in a recent post on Twitter/X. "The number of enemy reconnaissance UAVs drones even more significantly. Strikes against our deep rear directed by Orlan reconnaissance drones were reduced by a factor of ten. it is more difficult for the enemy to conduct aerial reconnaissance along the line of engagement. And this is the result of the work of FPV interceptors."
Sternenko notes that Lancet strikes are also being reduced because Ukraine is also targeting the operators. This may be achieved with electronic warfare systems to pinpoint the radio emissions controlling the drone, or by some other means.
As well as the ZALAs linked with the Lancet operations, the interceptors also bring down Supercam and Orlan-10 drones, which are associated with artillery and missile systems. Russia's barrage of guided-bombs similarly relies on drone data and it may be more difficult for them to locate targets now. The kill chain -- target identification, location, assignment of a weapon to engage, and engagement -- has been broken.
Longer-range strikes, such as the Shahed kamikaze drones flown against Ukraine's cities, are more likely to be directed by satellite data against buildings and other fixed targets and will not be affected. Which is why Wild Hornets are developing new Sting interceptors to take out the Shaheds.
Both sides are raising their game in the interceptor war in a fast-paced technology arms race . The Russians are equipping their reconnaissance drones with rear-facing cameras, strobe lights, and systems to carry out evasive maneuvers. Meanwhile Ukraine is building faster, more powerful interceptors and developing new sensors and new weapons to equip them. Both sides have started using net launchers in air-to-air combat.
Some commenters believed that Russia had so many reconnaissance drones that they would be impossible to stop. But a good supply of interceptors, which according to Sternenko cost just $750 each, already seem to be having an effect.
It is often overlooked that drones are now providing continuous surveillance of the entire length of the battlefront to a considerable depth. This intelligence gathering capability may be the most significant aspect of drone warfare, enabling deep, high-precision strikes with a variety of weapons from cruise missiles to rockets to airstrikes to attack drones. If the interceptors continue to triumph, Ukraine may win a monopoly on that capability.